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Abstract. This article highlights some problems with developing causal explanations for historical 
phenomena. 
 
With the mass media's trumpeting of Pol Pot's death comes renewed analysis concerning why the brutal 
rule of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia occurred between 1975-1978. 
 
One notion is that the intensive bombing of Indochina by the United States military in the 1970s induced 
psychopathology within the Khmer Rouge leadership that impelled the latter towards policies leading to 
the deaths of more than one seventh of the Cambodian population. This notion is often countered with 
the observation that other political groupings that experienced the bombing even more severely--e.g., 
Vietnamese and Laotian Communists--did not engage in such brutal rule. This counter, however, does 
not take into account the diathesis-stress model of psychopathology--that an individual's probability of 
manifesting what is termed psychopathology is founded on susceptibility as well as stressors. Moreover, 
the stressor contribution to psychopathology is dependent on how the former is experienced by an 
individual being evaluated for psychopathology--not on how the stressor is somehow "objectively" 
perceived by an individual's evaluator. 
 
The very notion of psychopathology ascribed to political phenomena may manifest the significant 
interpretive error of instinctive and compulsive "medicalizing" and even the absolution of perpetrators 
through blaming some hypothetical disease or unnatural process. This medicalizing may often be an 
inducer, maintainer, or manifestor of a false consciousness that guards against accurate perception of 
social, economic, cultural, and political factors intrinsic to one's environment that have at least a 
significant potential for causal relevance. Medicalizing also may serve positive functions that create a 
motive force leading to their own perpetuation through the conscious and unconscious efforts of 
historians, analysts, and those living in the era being studied. (Another problem is that psychopathology 
applications to political behavior often do not address group and organizational phenomena nor the 
distinction between psychopathology and dysfunction.) 
 
(A version of the above is that only Pol Pot was psychopathological--viz., paranoid. This may have been 
the case. However, as previously described in IBPP, many of the psychiatric criteria crucial to the 
diagnosis of paranoia seem too consonant with those linked with successful leadership by political 
philosophers throughout history to elicit immediate acceptance of a nonadaptive label. As well, Pol Pot's 
employment of what might be called radical behaviorism--punishment for poor performance and 
noncompliance regardless of other factors--is but the logical outgrowth (even if the negative underside 
of a foundation of contemporary psychology.)) 
 
A second notion is that the Khmer Rouge leadership were committed to creating an ethnically pure 
Cambodia and harbored intense bias against other ethnic groups. Historical examples of ethnic brutality 
in the service of cleansing the body politic of impurities abound and also serve as a foundation for 
psychodynamic approaches to political psychology going back at least to the classical text of Harold 
Lasswell. Yet in the Khmer Rouge's case, this notion is often dismissed as merely inaccurate--that the 
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brutal rule was unrelated to ethnic bias. This dismissal can be based on the observation that many so-
called pure Cambodians also met their demise at the hands of the Khmer Rouge. A counter to the 
dismissal, however, is that the "non-pure" died through ethnic bias, the "pure" through other factors. 
Another is that the "pure" who died were perceived not to be "pure" because of their real or alleged 
noncompliance with their ethnic orientation. Returning to the notion of ethnic bias as the significant 
causal factor, one must note that--as with those exposed to bombing described above--not all who meet 
identical criteria experienced the same fate. 
 
A third common notion is that the ideology of totalitarianism was most responsible for the Khmer 
Rouge's brutal rule. Perhaps, but what were the conditions under which totalitarianism as an ideology 
was embraced as opposed to other conditions that might have fostered receptivity to some other belief 
system or even to totalitarianism as ideology that did not impel consonant action? 
 
As can be seen in this brief excursion, common causal analyses concerning the Khmer Rouge's rule do 
not seem compelling. Historical interpretation--based on variants of logical positivism, postmodernism, 
or a moral sense of entitlement--appears dubious. The quest for meaning must continue. (See 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.). (1994). Washington, D.C.: American 
Psychiatric Association; Lasswell, H. (1930). Psychopathology and politics. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press; Lepper, G. (1996). Between science and hermeneutics: Towards a contemporary empirical 
approach to the study of interpretation in analytic psychotherapy. British Journal of Psychotherapy, 13,, 
219-231; Morris, S.J. (April 17, 1998). Pol Pot's lingering influence. The New York Times, p. A25; Paranoia 
and political leadership. (January 24, 1997). IBPP, 1(9); Phillips, J. (1996). Key concepts: Hermeneutics. 
Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, 3, 61-69; Richardson, F.C., & Fowers, B.J. (1998). Interpretive 
social science: An overview. American Behavioral Scientist, 41, 465-495; Walker, J.A. (1996). Learning to 
be interpretive: Hermeneutics and personal texts. Marriage and Family Review, 28, 223-239; 
Wisniewski, E.J., & Love, B.C. (1998). Relations versus properties in conceptual combination. Journal of 
Memory and Language, 38, 177-202.)(Keywords: Analysis, Cambodia, Interpretation, Paranoia.) 
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